ClippingKK

THE EVENTS SURROUNDING the Black Act would show that the Glorious Revolution had created the rule of law, and that this notion was stronger in England and Britain, and the elites were far more constrained by it than they themselves imagined. Notably, the rule of law is not the same as rule by law. Even if the Whigs could pass a harsh, repressive law to quash obstacles from common people, they had to contend with additional constraints because of the rule of law. Their law violated the rights that the Glorious Revolution and the changes in political institutions that followed from it had already established for everybody by tearing down the “divine” rights of kings and the privileges of elites.

as long as the planter elite was in control of its huge landholdings and remained organized, it could structure a new set of institutions, Jim Crow instead of slavery, to achieve the same objective. The vicious circle turned out to be stronger than many, including Abraham Lincoln, had thought. The vicious circle is based on extractive political institutions creating extractive economic institutions, which in turn support the extractive political institutions, because economic wealth and power buy political power. When forty acres and a mule was off the table, the southern planter elite’s economic power remained untarnished. And, unsurprisingly and unfortunately, the implications for the black population of the South, and the South’s economic development, were the same.

我们通常从人之常情讲，受宠的奴才管理不受宠的奴才，往往要比主人亲自管理奴才更糟糕，对奴才的怜惜和照顾的程度恐怕要更差。因为道理很简单，就算奴才不具人格只被视为财产，而个人的奴才不管怎么样，“产权明晰”是你自己的，这个所有权是很清楚的。比如你有一匹马，这一匹马既然是你的，你总不会无缘无故把它虐待死，杀了它对你有什么好处？你的“财产”不就损失了吗？大家都知道“兔子不吃窝边草”这个道理，那是因为窝边草是它自己的，它更愿意去吃别人的草。 但是受宠的奴才不太可能对不受宠的奴才产生一种“己物”爱惜照顾之心。因为他们本来就是陌生人，没有什么依附关系，这些人不是他自己的人，而是皇帝的人，他本人也是皇帝的人。对于他来讲，最重要的是怎么能够巩固皇帝对自己的宠爱，而不是怎么争取更多的人依附于自己——像我们经常讲的招降纳叛，吸引更多的人来投奔自已——在秦制下这可是大忌，要杀头的

所谓的酷吏、所谓的法吏，不是以伦理为中心的，不是道德挂帅的，但必须强调，他们的治理不是以法律为准绳，也不是提倡在法律面前人人平等的。所谓酷吏，实际上是一种权力中心主义的法家政治观，强调的是对权力的垄断。这种对权力的垄断与强调道德其实都属于人治，但是酷吏对法治的破坏作用——确切地说是对建设法治的阻碍作用，应该说要比伦理型的儒家人治更甚一筹。 我们清楚现代意义上讲的法治是什么。其实现代意义上的法治，说穿了就是以人权为基础的一种法律秩序，每一个人都有他的合法权利，应该得到保障。法律就是为了保障人权的，因此，法律对社会上的每一个人都构成约束，之所以约束就是因为害怕有人侵犯别人的权利。那么谁最有可能侵犯别人的权利呢？就是那些有权有势的人。法治首先要限制谁？首先是要限制政府，限制有权胡作非为的人。至于限制老百姓，那是次要的事。 但是秦代的法家不是这样。我前面已经从理论上澄清了所谓法家主张“王子犯法与庶民同罪”、法家“守法”、法家虽然残酷但“恶法亦法，胜于无法”、法家的性恶论有利于法治，等等，都是完全没有根据的奇谈怪论。秦代法家讲的“法”治就是我前面讲的——“法、术、势”，主要是管老百姓的，不是管皇帝的；是维护皇权，而不是维护人权的。与现代法治精神恰恰相反，法家只讲权力（power），不讲权利（right）。因此不仅皇帝是不受制约的，任何有权者对于无权者都是不受制约的。法家的做法可以说它是不讲道德的，但绝不能说它是讲法律的。更准确地说，它只讲“权力意志”，是靠赤裸裸的无限权力来进行治理的

但中国的“重农抑商”恰恰相反，“重农”就是要管制农业，农民只能种地，不让农民经商。所以大家不要以为“重农”就是重视农民利益，就一定对农民有好处。民众早就知道这个道理，叫“一管就死”“管一行死一行”。我国历史中经常有一种现象，就是朝廷不“重农”，农民的日子相对来讲还比较好过，朝廷越重农，农民越倒霉。因为朝廷越重农，就把农民管得越死，就会整天折腾农民，指定必须种什么、不能种什么、如何种田，把种田人搞得非常狼狈

中国后世历代都有这样一种源自法儒、道儒的争论，这并不是自由还是福利的争论，而是反自由还是反福利的争论。都是站在君主立场上博弈，“放”给贵族诸侯亦或收归国家。他们这些反自由者并不搞福利，而反福利的人也是如此，既反福利也不给自由。强调管制的一方主要想管制平民，而强调放任的一方主要想放纵权贵。于是就出现了一种现象，左是老百姓吃亏，右也是老百姓吃亏

Extractive political institutions thus also tend to create a vicious circle because they provide no line of defense against those who want to further usurp and misuse the powers of the state.

It was not only the economic incentives that were destroyed. The political changes that had started to take place also went into reverse. The power of chiefs and traditional rulers, which had previously been in decline, was strengthened, because part of the project of creating a cheap labor force was to remove private property in land.